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RECENT CASE NOTES
large group of cases that apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in cases
where a passenger on a common carrier is injured by machinery, appli-
ances, and other instrumentalities that are within the exclusive control
and management of the carrier.1S
Aside from the above cases where there was some relation between the
parties, the doctrine has been applied in cases where there is no relation-
ship between the parties, as where one who is lawfully in a public street
is injured by falling objects, obstructoins, openings, etc., that are wholly
within the control of the defendant. The following cases are examples of
such applications: where a passerby fell into an open coal hole on defend-
ant's sidewalk.19 Where a pedestrian was injured by objects falling upon
him from adjoining property such as an electric sign; 2 0 portion of a wall
of building;22 snow and ice from roof; 2 3 objects of merchandise, such as
barrels; 2 4 and where a traveler in the street stepped on fallen high voltage
wires of the defendant's lines and was injured, the doctrine was held to be
applicable.25 A. C. J.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS--FMLLING BLAINKS-COGNOViT NOTE-On or
about August 24, 1927, in pursuance of carrying out a contract of sale of
real estate located in the city of South Bend, Indiana, defendants gave to
plaintiff, both parties residents of Indiana, a note as part payment of the
purchase price. This note had the following clause with the blanks indi-
cated: " hereby authorizes any Attorney at Law to appear in any
Court of Record in the United States, after the above obligation becomes
due, and waive the issuing and service of process and confess a judgment
against - in favor of the holder." Plaintiff sues on this note. By
statute in Indiana the enforcement of a cognovit note is a misdemeanor.
Held, the note is not a cognovit note.1
This decision turns in part upon the recent cognovit note statutes. 2
I' Union Traction Co. v. Berry (1919), 188 Ind. 514, 121 N. E. 655; Feldman v.
Chicago Rys. Co. (1919), 289 Ill. 25, 124 N. n. 334; Mansfield Public Utility Co. V.
Grogg (1921), 103 Ohio 418, 132 N. E. 481; Williamson v. Salt Lake & 0. R. Co.
(1918), 52 Utah 84, 172 Paa. 680; Hughes -v. Atlantic City & S. R. Co. (1914), 85
N. J. L..212, 89 AUt. 769; Norfolk, etc. Ry. Co. v. Birchett (1918), 252 Fed. 512.
19 Gillis v. Cambridge Gaslight Co. (1909), 202 Mass. 222, 88 N. E. 779.
"'Excelsior Blec. Co. v. Sweet (1894), 57 N. J. L. 224, 30 Atl. 553.
2 Scheller v. Silbermintz (1906), 98 N. Y. S. 230, 50 Misc. 175;Kearner v. C. S.
Tourner Co. (1910), 31 R. I. 203, 76 Atl. 833.
2Kearney v. London, B. & S. C. R. Co. (1870), L. R. 5 Q. B. 411, 19 Eng. Rul.
Cas. 1; Brown v. Bryant (1911), 166 Mich. 18, 131 N. W. 577; McNamara v. Boston
& M. R. Co. (1909), 202 Mass. 491, 89 N. E. 131; Connolly v. Des Moines Invest.
Co. (1905), 130 Iowa 633, 105 N. W. 400; Hughes v. Harbor, etc. Savings Assoc.
(1909), 115 N. Y. S. 320.
3Shephard v. Creamer (1894), 160 Mass. 496, 36 N. E. 475.
2Byrne v. Boadle (1863), 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Repr. 299; Lowner v. New
York, etc. R. Co. (1900), 175 Mass. 166, 55 N. E. 805.
0 Snyder v. Wheeling Electrical Co. (1897), 43 W. Va. 661, 28 S. E. 733.
'Fodor v. Pott, Appellate Court of Indiana, Dec. 9, 1931, 178 N. E. 695.
sActs 1927, page 656; Sec. 640, 3 Burns 1929 Supplement: "Any negotiable
instrument, or other written contract to pay money, which contains any provision or
stipulation giving to any person or power of attorney, or authority as attorney, for
the maker, or any indorser, or assignor, or other person liable thereon, and in the
name of such maker, indorser, assignor, or other obligor to appear in any court,
whether of record or inferior, or to waive the issuance or personal service of process
in any action to enforce payment of the money, or any part claimed to be due
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These statutes may be considered as enactments of the rule many times
decided in Indiana that a contract made in advance of the coming into
existence of a cause of action, providing that something other than an
adjudication by a court having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject
matter shall be final and conclusive on the parties if and when such cause
of action shall arise, is contrary to public policy and void, as in effect
undertaking to oust the courts of jurisdiction.3
The statute4 does not expressly declare a cognovit note to be void but
makes it a misdemeanor to be a party to such a note, but a contract in
violation of a statute prohibiting the doing of the thing contracted for is
void, and no right can be founded on the violation of the law.5
Section 5 of the Negotiable Instrument Law6 says that the negotiable
character of an instrument otherwise negotiable is not affected by a pro-
vision which authorizes a confession of judgment if the instrument be not
paid at maturity or waives the benefit of any law intended for the advan-
thereon, or which contains any provision or stipulation authorizing or purporting
to authorize an attorney, agent, or other representative, be he designated howsoever,
to confess judgment on such instrument for a sum of money when such sum Is to
be ascertained, or such judgment is to be rendered or entered otherwise than by
action of court upon a hearing after personal service upon the debtor, whether with
or without attorney's fee, or which contains any provision or stipulation authorizing
or purporting to authorize any such attorney, agent or representative to release
errors, or the right of appeal from any judgment thereon, or consenting to the
issuance of execution on such judgment, is hereby designated, defined and declared
to be a cognovit note." Said act further provides that: "Any person, natural or
corporate, who directly or indirectly, shall procure another, or others, to execute
as maker, * * * or whoever being the payee, * * thereof shall accept
and retain in his possession any such instrument, * * S shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined," etc.
Acts 1927, page 174; Sec. 640, 1, Burns 1929 Supplement: "It shall be unlawful
to execute or procure to be executed as part of or in connection with the execution
of any negotiable Instrument, or other written contract to pay money, and before
a cause of action thereon shall have accrued, any contract, agreement, provision
or stipulation giving to any person or persons a power of attorney or authority as
attorney for the maker or endorser thereof, in his name to appear in any court of
record, aid waive the service of process in an action to enforce payment of money
claimed to be due thereon, or authorizing or purporting to authorize an attorney or
agent, howsoever designated to confess judgment on such instrument for a sum of
money to be ascertained in a manner other than by action of the court upon a
hearing after notice to the debtor, whether with or without an attorney fee, or
authorizing or purporting to authorize any such attorney to release errors and the
right of appealing from such judgment, or to the issue of execution on such judg-
ment. Any and all contracts, stipulations and powers of attorney given or entered
into before a cause of action on such promise to pay, shall have accrued, shall be
void." This section, however, is not directly referred to in the opinion.
s'Kstler v. Indianapolis, etc. R. Co., 88 Ind. 460, 464; Louisville, etc. R. Go. 'v.
Donnegan, 111 Ind. 179, 187, 12 N. E. 135; Supreme Council, etc. v. Forsinger, 135
Ind. 52, 56, 25 N. B. 129, 9 L. R. A. 501, 21 Am. St. 196; McCoy v. Able, 131 Ind.
417, 423, 30 N. E. 528; Ditton -v. Hart, 175 Ind. 181, 193, 93 N. B. 961; Maitland v.
Reed, 37 Ind. App. 469, 471, 77 N. E. 290; Irose v. Balla, 181 Ind. 491, 104 N. E.
851. The force given to a judgment obtained in another state by confession of
judgment is discussed in Garrigue v. Kellar, 164 Ind. 676, 74 N. E. 523, 69 A. L. R.
870, 108 Am. St. 324; Egley v. T. B. Bennett < Co., 196 Ind. 50, 145 N. E. 830, 40
A- L. R. 436, superseding 144 N. E. 533, which superseded 139 N. E. 385.
4 Sec. 640, 3 Burns 1929 Supplement.
See Moorhouse v. Kunkalman, 177 Ind. 471, 96 N. E. 600.
O Sec. 11364 Burns 1926.
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tage or protection of the obligor. This statute would be overruled by impli-
cation as conflicting with the later cognovit note statutes.7
Section 14 of the Negotiable Instrument Lawss says "Where the instru-
ment is wanting in any material particular, the person in possession
thereof has a prima facie authority to complete it by filling up the blanks
therein. In order, however, that any such instrument when completed,
may be enforced against any person who became a party thereto prior
to its completion, it must be filled up strictly in accordance with authority
given." Prima facie authority means ordinarily that there is a presump-
tion of authority until the presumption has been overcome by evidence
which clearly rebuts it. In this case there being no evidence that authority
to fill the blanks was not given, it would seem to follow by a literal inter-
pretation of the words of the statute that the blanks would be filled by
implication, thus rendering the note valueless and unlawful under the
statute. Such an erratic conclusion by a negative inference, the court
refused to reach and adopted the more liberal and commercially expedient
rule that words would not be supplied by construction which would make
the note void and it is not to be presumed that the intention was to execute
a contract that could not be enforced. A code statute unlike the ordinary
statute familiar to the common-law lawyer is not an exception to the law
on the subject which it covers. Therefore its words are to be given a
broad meaning rather than a strict construction, and when the plain mean-
ing of the words does not cover a point, then they are to be used as
examples of principles of law which are deduced from the code itself and
not from previous cases. 9 The Latin maxim "Ut res nugis valeat quam
pereat'"-that the thing may prevail, rather than be destroyed-is a sound
rule of construction which is frequently adopted by the courts to effectuate
the intention of parties to written instruments.1 0 The same maxim applies
to the construction of statutes. 11
There are several other states which have adopted the same view as
Indiana concerning a cognovit note and confession of judgment.12 The
cognovit note statute was discussed in two articles soon after it was en-
acted: "The Indiana Cognovit Note Statute," by Bernard C. Gavit;13
"The Cognovit Note Act," by G. A. Farabaugh and Walter R. Arnold.14
J. D. W.
7 Schaffer v. State, 202 Ind. 318, 173 N. E. 229.8 Sec. 11373 Burns 1926.
'See article by Frederick K. Beutel, 80 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1932), 368, 373.1)Heaston v. Krieg, 167 Ind. 101, 77 N. E. 805
"
2Board, etc. v. Albright, 168 Ind. 564, 81 N. E. 578.
2 First National Bank v. White, 220 Mo. 717, 16 Ann. Cas. 889; Farquhar v.
Dehaven, 70 W. Va. 738, 75 S. E. 65, 1914 A Ann. Cas., 640, 40 L. R. A. (n. s.) 956.
125 Ind. . J. 208.
14 5 Ind. L. J. 93.
